Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Now or Never.

Way back in the 80s when the US CIA Chief William Casey passed away , the former Afghan War Veteran and Incharge of Afghan Desk Brigadier ® Yousuf (Author of Bear Trap and former Information Secretary of Farooq Laghari’s Millat Party) opined that loss of William Casey is a blow to Afghan Jihad. In any war indoctrination, books, pamphlet play a key role and during Afghan War the CIA-ISI Duo made effective use of Indoctrination , the backbone of Afghan Jihad were of those who followed Ikhwanul Muslimoon and their violent ideology and that ideology was tapped to get the desired results. “The CIA used Uzbek Exile to translate such material in Uzbek Language and also translated Quran in Uzbek language to push it into the then Central Asian States and that was in 1984. William Casey wanted USSR to bleed as much like the USA bled in Vietnam and after the breakup of USSR we witnessed the rise of Islamic Extremists in the Central Asia. Pakistan was a conduit for such indoctrination, and such indoctrination was excessively done with Afghan Refugees and Mujahideen as well , for example "quote" “Math teachers use bullets as props to teach lessons in subtraction. This isn't their idea. During decades of war, the classroom has been the best place to indoctrinate young people with their duty to fight. Government-sponsored textbooks in Afghanistan are filled with violence. For years, war was the only lesson that counted. The Mujahideen, Afghanistan's freedom fighters, used the classroom to prepare children to fight the Soviet empire. The Russians are long gone but the textbooks are not. The Mujahideen had wanted to prepare the next generation of Afghans to fight the enemy, so pupils learned the proper clips for a Kalashnikov rifle, the weight of bombs needed to flatten a house, and how to calculate the speed of bullets. Even the girls learn it.

How Cia-Isi-Mossad made Taliban.Where they got there Training who are they who supplies them weopans

When Clement Rodney Hampton-el, a hospital technician from Brooklyn, New Jersey, returned home from the war in Afghanistan in 1989, he told friends his only desire was to return. Though he had been wounded in the arm and leg by a Russian shell, he said he had failed. He had not achieved martyrdom in the name of Islam. So he found a different theatre for his holy war and achieved a different sort of martyrdom. Three years ago, he was convicted of planning a series of massive explosions in Manhattan and sentenced to 35 years in prison. Hampton-el was described by prosecutors as a skilled bomb-maker. It was hardly surprising. In Afghanistan he fought with the Hezb-i-Islami group of mujahideen, whose training and weaponry were mainly supplied by the CIA. He was not alone. American officials estimate that, from 1985 to 1992, 12,500 foreigners were trained in bomb-making, sabotage and urban guerrilla warfare in Afghan camps the CIA helped to set up. Since the fall of the Soviet puppet government in 1992, another 2,500 are believed to have passed through the camps. They are now run by an assortment of Islamic extremists, including Osama bin Laden, the world's most wanted terrorist. Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia in 1979, aged 22. Though he saw a considerable amount of combat - around the eastern city of Jalalabad in March 1989 and, earlier, around the border town of Khost - his speciality was logistics. From his base in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, he used his experience of the construction trade, and his money, to build a series of bases where the mujahideen could be trained by their Pakistani, American and, if some recent press reports are to be believed, British advisers. One of the camps bin Laden built, known as Al-Badr, was the target of the American missile strikes against him last summer. Now it is used by Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Pakistan-based organisation that trains volunteers to fight in Kashmir. Some of their recruits kidnapped and almost certainly killed a group of Western hostages a few years ago. The bases are still full of new volunteers, many Pakistanis. Most of those who were killed in last August's strikes were Pakistani. A Harkut-ul-Mujahideen official said last week that it had Germans and Britons fighting for the cause, as well as Egyptians, Palestinians and Saudis. Muslims from the West as well as from the Middle East and North Africa are regularly stopped by Pakistani police on the road up the Khyber Pass heading for the camps. Hundreds get through. Afghan veterans have now joined bin Laden's al-Qaeda group. Some have returned to former battlegrounds, like the university-educated Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, a key figure in the Egyptian al-Jihad terrorist group. Al-Zawahiri ran his own operation during the Afghan war, bringing in and training volunteers from the Middle East. Some of the $500 million the CIA poured into Afghanistan reached his group. Al-Zawahiri has become a close aide of bin Laden and has now returned to Afghanistan to work with him. His al-Jihad group has been linked to the Yemeni kidnappers. One Saudi journalist who interviewed bin Laden in 1989 remembers three of his close associates going under the names of Abu Mohammed, Abu Hafz and Abu Ahmed. All three fought with bin Laden in the early Eighties, travelled with him to the Sudan and have come back to Afghanistan. Afghan veterans, believed to include men who fought the Americans in Somalia, have also returned. Other members of al-Quaeda remain overseas. Afghan veterans now linked to bin Laden have been traced by investigators to Pakistan, East Africa, Albania, Chechnya, Algeria, France, the US and Britain. At least one of the kidnappers in Yemen was reported to have fought in Afghanistan and to be linked to al-Quaeda. Despite reports that bin Laden was effectively funded by the Americans, it is impossible to gauge how much American aid he received. He was not a major figure in the Afghan war. Most American weapons, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, were channelled by the Pakistanis to the Hezb-i-Islami faction of the mujahideen led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Bin Laden was only loosely connected with the group, serving under another Hezb-i-Islami commander known as Engineer Machmud. However, bin Laden's Office of Services, set up to recruit overseas for the war, received some US cash. But according to one American official, concentrating on bin Laden is a mistake. 'The point is not the individuals,' he said last week. 'The point is that we created a whole cadre of trained and motivated people who turned against us. It's a classic Frankenstein's monster situation.' Others point out that the military contribution of the 'Arabs', as the overseas volunteers were known, was relatively small. 'The fighting was done by the Afghans and most of them went back to their fields when Kabul fell to the mujahideen,' said Kamaal Khan, a Pakistani defence analyst. 'Ironically, the bulk of American aid went to the least effective fighters, who turned most strongly to bite the hand that fed them.'

WHY AMERICANS ARE NOT PAYING TO THE DONKEY CONTRACTORS

Afghan donkey contractors, some of whom haven't been paid for more than a year, are threatening to bring the war effort to a halt.

Yes, donkey contractors.

Kevin Sieff of The Washington Post reports that as the footprint of American forces in Afghanistan diminishes and ground bases built on the back of cutting edge technology is handed over to Afghan Security Forces, donkeys are making a comeback.

“Donkeys are the Afghan helicopter,” Col. Abdul Nasseeri, an Afghan battalion commander in the Konar province, tells the Post.

It's more of out of necessity than anything else as U.S. commanders refuse to buy the Afghans helicopters because they say choppers are too costly and not essential to the mission.

Sieff writes:

But even a solution as seemingly simple and sustainable as donkey supply convoys has become subject to corruption and incompetence, an emblem of the logistical problems plaguing the Afghan army. Just as Afghans are preparing to inherit dozens of bases, all of which will require donkeys for daily or weekly rations, the funding to pay donkey contractors has disappeared. The Afghan army’s relatively modern bureaucracy has proven incapable of acquiring even ancient tools.

The problem goes beyond the failures of Afghans and into the American negligence. Recently, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a report which concluded that reconstruction funds were so mismanaged that many projects would not be completed, and if they were, they could not be maintained by the Afghans.

From the SIGAR report:

The ANSF lacks personnel with the technical skills required to operate and maintain critical facilities, such as water supply, waste water treatment, and power generation. 

The Ministry of Defense’s procurement process is unable to provide the Afghan army with (Operation and Maintenance) O&M supplies in a timely manner.

With a corrupt system of money disbursement hindering the Afghan army from running basic services or bringing enough water to their troops, it's no wonder they're having difficulty maintaining the 40,000 Ford Ranger Light Tactical Vehicles given to them by the Ford Motor Company.

"The best we can do is donkeys,” a 16-year-old  donkey handler told The Post. “Without donkeys, there would be no Afghan army.”

And U.S. advisers are now devoting much of their time trying to solve the donkey problem in key fighting positions because if they don't, the 11-year war effort will completely unravel.

“If you lose the outposts, the Taliban have an open door to walk right in,” Sgt. Travis Washington told The Post.

Given that the there will be no peace agreement between the Afghans and the Taliban before the U.S. leaves in 2014, time is running out to master the donkey system.

“Who knew that the end of this war would boil down to donkey contracts?” Lt. Col. Brandon Newton, commander of Task Force Lethal Warrior in Konar, told The Post. “I wasn’t trained for this