Allegedly, his son, a Major in the Army, was not being cleared for repatriation. Anwarul Haq was elevated to the Supreme Court by the tim e the inquiry was reopened in 1974. A.T. Chaudhuri, one of Pakistan's most intrepid journalists, wrote a revealing article on the Commission in Dawn (July 23 and 26, 1986). It was "based on incontrovertible evidence gathered from and corroborated by several sources. The object is to bring out how a democratic regime accountable to the people tried to muzzle and sweep under the carpet the report of a high-powered commission it had itself set up... "One can say, on the authority of unimpeachable sources, that the probe body was specifically told to confine its investigation to the 'military debacle' and not to delve into the 'causes of surrender', notably its political background. Chief Justice Ham oodur Rahman is believed to have pleaded for the enlargement of the terms of reference to enable him to look into the 'totality of the situation' before the traumatic fall of Dhaka. But he was firmly directed not to burn his fingers with the political ne ttle. The implication was clear." The Commission was "saddled with a former Defence Secretary". Lt. Gen. Altaf Qadir and another high-ranking officer who was the author of Pakistan Army and who had close links with the regime in power. Neither Yahya Khan nor Bhutto was examined though the former submitted a written statement to the Commission (Khabrain; July 15-16, 1994). The Supplementary Report reveals that, like the Main Report, it was tailored to Bhutto's needs. "After analysing the evidence brought before the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Ar med Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, and that there wa s indeed substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army Officers had not only indulged in large-scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership." --- Tikka Khan, "the butcher", was not only exonerated of all charges but was praised: "always willing to redress grievances." Figures of the killings provided by the Army HQs (that is, Tikka Khan) were readily accepted. "Indian infiltrators and members of M ukti Bahini sponsored by the Awami League continue (even after March 25, 1971) to indulge in killings, rape and arson". Read this: "We consider, therefore, that unless the Bangladesh authorities can produce some convincing evidence, it is not possible to record a finding that any intellectuals or professionals were indeed arrested and killed by the Pakistan Army during December 1971." In an article free of any trace of the national chauvinism that besets most in our region, Ahmed Salim exposed this falsehood in the Karachi monthly Newsline (September 2000). The Sunday Times (London) of December 19, 1971 had reported the killing in Dhaka of more than 50 of surviving intellectuals, scientists and businessmen. On January 19, 1992, 101 well-known Bangladeshi personalities including retired Supreme Court Judges, university teachers, veterans of the independence war, artists and journalists formed a committee known as the Ekatarer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee, to track down the killers and collaborators of the 1971 war of independence. Two other bodies deserve mention - the National People's Enquiry Commission of Bangladesh and Generation 1971. "Members of the organisation say they aim to discover why their parents were slaughtered, to investigate war crimes, and to provide fina ncial assistance to families who were left destitute after the '71 carnage." It is no consolation to them that the Report recommended court-martialling of named officers. They all went scot-free, retiring with full pension, save for Niazi and one Brigadier Baquir Siddique. None of those recommended for trial by courts martial was affected one bit. Chaudhury need not have worried. The Commission did not confine itself to its terms of reference. It roamed far and wide to discuss inter alia the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971; failure to achieve a political settlement between May and Septemb er 1971; Yahya Khan's rejection of the Soviet resolution in the U.N. Security Council; Yahya Khan's coup and even "the genesis of the Pakistan movement, the events preceding the establishment of Pakistan, and the political developments which took place b etween 1947 and 1971, including a detailed study of the effects of the two Martial Law periods in hastening the process of political and emotional isolation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan." Its studied omission to deal with Bhutto's role in Dhaka in March 1971 and at the Security Council in December 1971 is as indefensible as it is understandable. It was out "to fix" his opponents; not bring him to account. (For details on Bhutto's role vid e the writer's "The Making of Bangladesh"; Frontline; January 10, 1997) The whole episode of "the Polish Resolution" of December 15, which Bhutto had rejected brusquely, is omitted. The Commission was aware of public disquiet. Outlook of Ka rachi, a weekly edited by the late I.H. Burney, faced Bhutto's ire fearlessly. Its issue of May 25, 1974 carried a brilliant documented "Staff Study" entitled "The War Commission and the Surrender." The facts were well set out and the issues squarely rai sed. It recalled that Bhutto had said on November 23, 1971, that Pakistan should not move the Security Council. The Report censured Yahya Khan, instead, for this omission. Niazi's record reveals him to be a singularly loathsome character. But every man is entitled to justice according to the law. In his memoirs The Betrayal of East Pakistan (Oxford, 1998; pp. 321; Rs.450) he makes the valid point that had he been co urt-martialled under the Pakistan Army Act, as he had demanded, he would have been entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, produce evidence in defence and be represented by a lawyer. A Commission of Inquiry's denial of these rights to any person likely to be affected by its findings vitiates its Report completely. He writes: "Although the Commission consisted of three judges, a legal and a military adviser, the perennial presence of a GHQ team, comprising Major-General Qureshi, Colonel Sabir Qureshi, a nd others, was indeed baffling. Their pompous manner and constant interference were not only irritating, but they also reduced the HRC to an illegal Court of Inquiry.
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